

TOP SECRET

29 October 1965

Copy No. C

135

25X1



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.

[Redacted box]

25X1

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600040001-2

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600040001-2

29 October 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS



25X1

4. Burundi: More executions of Hutus may lead to tribal warfare. (Page 5)
5. Communist China: Food production fails to keep up with population growth. (Page 6)
6. France-NATO: Paris intends to negotiate bilaterally with US on US bases. (Page 8)



25X1

8. Dominican Republic: Military leaders attempt to improve relations with the provisional government. (Page 10)
9. Brazil: No startling reactions so far to government's "Institutional Act." (Page 11)
10. Note: Sudan. (Page 13)



25X1

**Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Burundi: The summary execution of ten Hutu political leaders yesterday by the Tutsi-dominated government may lead to tribal warfare,

Over 40 Hutu military personnel allegedly involved in last week's coup attempt already had been executed. Most of the top Hutu leaders now are either dead or imprisoned. Rural Hutus, who comprise the overwhelming majority of the population, may further retaliate against the Tutsis when the latest executions become widely known.

The small largely Belgian-officered Burundi Army and gendarmerie probably could not put down extensive tribal disorders and if faced with civil war would probably split along tribal lines. The King may renew efforts to obtain military assistance from Leopoldville, or elsewhere. Although he so far has been able to deter major tribal violence, he seems to be badly frightened and to have come under the influence of the extremist Tutsis. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Some of these extremists now are charging that the US is backing a Hutu takeover of Burundi. [redacted] [redacted] the King has been persuaded to expel US diplomats and invite back the Chinese Communists, who were themselves expelled last January. The Burundi foreign minister will reportedly leave for Peking tomorrow. 7 [redacted]

25X1

25X1

29 Oct 65

5

25X1

Communist China: Chinese food production will apparently fail to keep up with population growth in 1965.

A good late harvest is expected, but this will at most balance an estimated several million-ton drop in the early 1965 crop. Although regime spokesmen have made vague claims that the harvest was "good," Peking has also been giving considerable publicity to "natural calamities," suggesting that the Chinese themselves do not expect the 1965 crop will be any better than last year's.

Peking continues its efforts to ensure food supplies by contracting for large quantities of grain for future years. A new three-year wheat purchase with Canada for five million tons of wheat contains a provision for increasing that figure by seven and one half million tons and for extending the agreement through 1970, apparently contingent on Ottawa's ability to make more grain available. Chinese negotiators have reportedly asked for a larger amount from Australia than the 500,000 tons of grain currently offered for early 1966. Negotiations under way with Argentina reportedly cover another one million ton contract for next year.

Continuing high imports of grain from the West and the production of vegetables and other auxiliary foods will probably maintain food supplies until next spring's harvest. However, per capita food consumption will not rise above the present level and will remain below that of 1957, the year before Peking embarked on the "Great Leap Forward."

(continued)

29 Oct 65

6

25X1

The population is probably increasing at something above 15 million a year. A birth control campaign is only in its first stages in the rural areas where the population problem must eventually be solved and is unlikely to have important effects for years to come.

25X1

29 Oct 65

7

25X1

France-NATO: [Charles Lucet, director of political affairs in the Foreign Ministry, has reiterated France's intention to seek bilateral negotiations with the US on the continued use of "purely US" military facilities in France before moving against NATO facilities.]

[Lucet, who is ambassador-designate to the US, told an embassy official that initially France would want to discuss those agreements having only the most tenuous connection with NATO. He envisioned broadening these discussions at some later point to include such matters as the status and future of SHAPE.]

[Lucet gave no specific indication as to when France would formally propose bilateral talks although he said that he might receive instructions in Washington to open the matter. He also noted that recent articles in the US press on the French attitude toward NATO would make the situation more difficult when the NATO discussions were "really broached" in 1966.]

25X1

29 Oct 65

8

25X1



\*Dominican Republic: [Armed Forces Secretary Rivera Caminero told his service chiefs yesterday that if they expect to retain their positions, relations between the military and President Garcia Godoy must be improved.]

[His remarks followed an amicable meeting with Ambassador Bunker on 27 October. ]

25X1

[To indicate their willingness to cooperate with the provisional government, the armed forces commanders are prepared to accept immediately the integration of approximately 400 rebel military personnel at the grades and ranks they held on 24 April 1965, when the revolution started.]

[It is doubtful, however, that Garcia Godoy will change his determination to replace most, if not all, of the present military leaders. He, like many Dominicans, apparently is convinced that the present leadership of the Dominican armed forces is a barrier to national reconciliation. The public identifies this group with the military coup which overthrew Juan Bosch in 1963 and allegedly committed brutalities early in this year's revolution.]

25X1

29 Oct 65

10

25X1

Brazil: There have been no startling reactions thus far within Brazil to the government's sudden announcement on 27 October of a new "Institutional Act."

President Castello Branco's drastic move in decreeing sweeping powers for the regime appears to have at least temporarily stilled the political turmoil that has persisted since the 3 October gubernatorial elections. [The military reportedly are satisfied that the Institutional Act provides the President with sufficient authority to continue the revolution that overthrew the Goulart regime in early 1964.]

A protest demonstration by several hundred university students in Rio de Janeiro is the only significant disturbance noted thus far.

Press reaction has been mixed with most major papers highlighting Justice Minister Magalhaes' statement that the administration will exercise its new powers only in cases of necessity.

The US Embassy reports that congress has received the news of the act "with calm and resignation." A number of deputies have indicated relief and a feeling that the act may provide the country with a constructive breathing spell. The legislators have begun to form political "blocs" as substitutes for the abolished political parties.

Several prominent governors, including De Barros of Sao Paulo and Magalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais, have expressed open approval of the Institutional Act and called for public understanding. At the same time the government is making a special effort to reassure labor that workers' rights will not be affected by the new decree.

(continued)

29 Oct 65

11

25X1

Havana has issued a lengthy and severe attack against the Brazilian Government, accusing it of being "nothing more than an occupation force serving US imperialism." The Cuban statement exhorted all Brazilians, including the military, to enter into "armed struggle" against the regime. This is the most militant call for revolution to come from Havana in months.

No official reaction from other Latin American countries has been reported, but it is likely that some governments may question the advisability of holding the OAS Inter-American Conference in Rio on 17 November as scheduled.

25X1


29 Oct 65

12

25X1

NOTE

\*Sudan: The political scene in Khartoum deteriorated further last night as the urban National Union Party announced it had pulled out of the shaky governing coalition dominated by the generally conservative Umma party. Although negotiations may still be under way to salvage the coalition, the Umma is facing trouble on several other fronts. The Communist-influenced railway workers' union is out on a four-day strike and some of the police in Khartoum have demonstrated against the government. Morale of army troops fighting dissidents in the south has seriously deteriorated and several officers in Juba were imprisoned by their troops early this week.]



25X1

29 Oct 65

13

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET